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Abstract
In models with a representative innitely lived household, tax smoothing implies that
the steady state of government debt should follow a random walk. This is unlikely to
be the case in OLG economies, where the equilibrium interest rate may di¤er from the
policy makers rate of time preference. It may therefore be optimal to reduce debt today
to reduce distortionary taxation in the future. In addition, the level of the capital stock
in these economies is likely to be sub-optimally low, and reducing government debt will
crowd in additional capital. Using a version of the model of perpetual youth developed
by Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965), with both public and private capital, we show
that it is optimal in steady state for the government to hold assets. However, we also
show how and why this level of government assets can fall short of both the level of
debt that achieves the optimal capital stock and the level that eliminates income taxes.
Finally we compute the optimal adjustment path to this steady state.
JEL Codes: E21, E32, E63
Keywords: Non-Ricardian consumers, macroeconomic stability, distortionary taxes.
1 Introduction
The problems caused by excessive levels of public debt do not need enumerating. As gov-
ernments around the world try to bring decits under control, and subsequently to reduce
levels of debt in relation to GDP, a natural question to ask is how far debt levels should be
reduced, and how quickly, once any immediate crisis resulting from large default risk premia
has diminished. In other words, what should be the ultimate target for the debt-to-GDP
ratio, and how quickly should we get there? Until now, most analysis of this question has
Our thanks to Charles Brendon, Alfred Greiner, Tom Holden, Eric Leeper, Pei-Ju Liao, Patrick Min-
ford, Balazs Parkanyi, Matteo Salto, Mathias Trabandt, Mike Wickens, and participants at the ASSA/AEA
meetings in San Diego and seminars in Brussels, Cardi¤ and Oxford for helpful comments, but all respon-
sibility remains ours. Leith and Wren-Lewis and grateful for nancial support from the ESRC (Award No.
RES-062-23-1436).
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been undertaken using models in which consumers in e¤ect live forever, by appropriately in-
ternalizing the utility of their children. This tends to have the implication that the optimal
level of debt depends upon the initial level of debt as policy makers seek to minimize the
costs of distortionary taxation going forwards (see Barro (1979) and Chamley (1985,1986) for
example). The implications of the benchmark result in such models is striking: once fears of
default have receded, the optimum level of debt is closely tied to the historic debt level. This
martingale process for debt has also re-emerged in New Keynesian style DSGE models (see,
for example, Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a)), where
policy makers also care about the costs of ination in a sticky-price environment as well as
minimizing the costs of tax distortions. These applications of tax smoothing all suggest that
attempts to reduce the extent of distortionary taxation in the long run will require short run
increases in these taxes whose cost outweighs the eventual gain.
However, within this literature there have been attempts to analyze the optimal quantity
of debt by introducing additional costs or benets associated with the level of government
debt. For example, in Aiyagari et al. (2002) implicit risk premia in an economy with
incomplete nancial markets may encourage the government to accumulate su¢ cient assets
to pay for (exogenously determined, but stochastic) government spending after eliminating
distortionary taxation, although introducing ad-hoc limits on the levels of assets held by the
government will ensure policy is more akin to that described in the original tax smoothing
result of Barro (1979). Aiyagari and McGratten (1998) allow for a role for government debt
in that it can help alleviate householdsborrowing constraints, while Shin (2006) allows for
household heterogeneity and idiosyncratic income shocks to provide a role for government
debt in facilitating precautionary saving. However, with the exception of Aiyagari and
McGratten (1998), where the policy maker trades o¤ the use of government debt to facilitate
household self-insurance and the crowding out of private capital, these papers do not allow
for the latter phenomenon.1
In overlapping generations economies, where agents do not care about their children (or
do not care about them enough), this e¤ect is central to the desirability of stabilizing debt.
There are, in fact, two reasons why the random walk steady-state debt result no longer holds
in these Non-Ricardian economies. First, if the economy is not dynamically ine¢ cient, then
the real interest rate is likely to exceed the rate of time preference, which means that, from
a Ramsey planners point of view, it may be worth sacricing some current utility in order
to achieve a steady state where distortionary taxes are lower than they currently are (even
if the current generation may lose out as a result). Second, as noted above, the level of
the capital stock (and therefore output and consumption) in these economies is likely to be
sub-optimally low, and reducing government debt will crowd inadditional capital.
This raises an immediate question: will the implicit debt target in such models be the
debt level that eliminates the need for distortionary taxes or will it be the level that achieves
the optimal capital stock? This is one of the issues we examine in this paper. Using an
1 In Aiyagari and McGratten(1998) this trade-o¤ is nely balanced under their benchmark calibration such
that historically observed debt levels are close to optimal.
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elaborate version of the model of perpetual youth developed by Blanchard (1985) and Yaari
(1965), which allows us to vary the extent of Non-Ricardian behavior parametrically, we
derive the optimal steady-state level of government assets. We show how and why this level
of government assets can fall short of both the level of debt that achieves the optimal capital
stock and the level that eliminates income taxes. In other words, although optimal policy
leads to an accumulation of government assets, this falls well short of both the war chest
level needed to fund government consumption/investment, eliminate distortionary taxes and
o¤set the monopolistic competition distortion and the level needed to crowd-in the rst best
level of private capital.
Another issue we explore is whether or not variations in public capital can counteract
any crowding out of private capital. We nd little use of public capital in this way in steady
state. However, when we explore the non-linear path the policy maker follows in moving the
economy from its current position to the desired long-run solution of the Ramsey problem,
there is a role for public investment. The dynamics under optimal policy imply that the pace
of debt stabilization should be very slow, but that during the transition a sell-o¤ of public
capital can optimally reduce debt service costs when debt levels are sub-optimally high.
Finally, we attempt to reconcile our results, which suggest it is optimal for the Ramsey
policy maker to accumulate assets, with the observation that very few governments have
more than paid o¤ their debt stocks. We nd that a very modest degree of policy maker
myopia (as a simple means of capturing political frictions in scal policy making) is su¢ cient
to support a positive public debt stock in steady state. However the welfare costs of this are
very high, suggesting that improving policy institutions to remove short-sightedness should
be a policy priority
Section 2 outlines an extended model of perpetual youth, which features exogenous
growth, distortionary taxation, government consumption and public and private physical
capital accumulation. In section 3, we discuss social welfare, the models calibration, and
our numerical results for both the steady state of the Ramsey problem and the non-linear
Ramsey dynamics. A nal section concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we outline our model. Our economy is populated by overlapping generations
of consumers who face a constant probability of death, such that, even if taxes were lump
sum, Ricardian Equivalence would not hold in our model.2 These consumers supply labor
to imperfectly competitive rms, who combine this labor with capital rented from a repre-
sentative capital rental rm and public capital accumulated by the government, to produce
a di¤erentiated product. Consumerslabor income is taxed and they hold nancial wealth
in the form of bonds and equities, as well as life-insurance contracts. We introduce public
capital to allow for the possibility that the policy maker may build up the stock of such
2For a recent analysis that investigates further the short term role that scal policy can play in this class
of models, see Devereau (2010).
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capital to o¤set the crowding-out of private sector capital due to government debt.
2.1 ConsumersBehavior
Here we introduce the main departure from the canonical Neo-Classical representative agent
model. As we note below, for the random walk in steady-state debt result to hold, the real
rate of interest has to be exactly equal to the rate of time preference. One reason why this
might not be is that agents fail to act as if they internalize the utility of their children, either
because they are selsh, or because of distortions like estate taxes. A benchmark model
that examines economies where agents do not internalize the welfare of their children is the
model of perpetual youth developed by Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965). In this model,
to induce nitely-lived households to hold a positive stock of government debt, real interest
rates rise above the householdsrate of time preference.
In the perpetual-youth model, households face a constant probability of death (1   ).
As this is a constant exogenous probability, and there is a continuum of households, there is
no aggregate uncertainty in our economy. This implies that a consumer born at time i, who
is still alive at time t; receives utility from consuming a basket of consumer goods at time t,
cit =
Z 1
0
cit(j)
" 1
" dj
 "
" 1
:
They also derive utility from consumption of publicly provided goods, gt, and su¤er disutility
from supplying labor to imperfectly competitive rms, lit.
3 We can write this households
expected utility function as,
1X
t=0
()t

ln cit + # ln gt + { ln(1  lit)

;
where # and { are the relative weights in utility from public goods consumption and leisure,
respectively. Also, by reducing the households discount factor  by the survival probability
, we are implicitly conditioning on the survival of this particular household (otherwise there
would be double-counting of the probability of death).
Due to the di¢ culties in conceptualizing complete nancial contracts amongst markets
participants some of whom are as yet unborn, we assume that nancial markets are in-
complete, but in an economy without aggregate uncertainty. Accordingly, we assume that
households can hold risk-free real one-period government bonds bit, which pay a gross real
interest rate of rt regardless of the state of nature (including the survival of the bond holder).
Households also buy shares vit, for a real price q
v
t , in the capital rental rm which pays out
its net cash ows as dividends, dt.4 They can also enter into survival-contingent contracts
3 In the context of our model economy, the very wealthy individuals may have a downward sloping labour
supply, as pointed out by Ascari and Rankin (2007). While this is an important aspect, in this paper we
focus the analysis on aggregate dynamics and abstract from distributional issues. And, on the aggregate, the
labour supply has the standard shape.
4By assuming rms accumulate capital rather than households doing so directly, we ensure that the capital
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with other households, which pay an agreed sum to other households in the event of the
individuals death, but entitle the individual to similar payments from deceased households
should the individual survive. The individual will construct a portfolio of bonds, equities and
survival-contingent contracts such that the payo¤ from that portfolio should the individual
die is zero. However, if household i is lucky enough to survive their combined return from
risk-free bonds, equities and survival-contingent contracts written against those bonds and
shares will be
bit 1rt 1
 and
(qvt+dt)v
i
t 1
 , respectively. This is simply an alternative means of
capturing the insurance contracts usually undertaken within the Blanchard-Yaari set-up.
Consumers seek to maximize utility subject to the demand schedule for their labor ser-
vices and their budget constraint, which can be written as
bit + q
v
t v
i
t + c
i
t = (1   t)wtlit +
rt 1bit 1

+
(qvt + dt)v
i
t 1

+ (1  )
Z 1
0

jtdj
where all variables are real. Here consumers earn after-tax income from their labor services,
(1   t)wtlit; and receive their share of the prots of nal goods producers, (1  )
R 1
0 
jtdj.
Let us dene
H it 

(1   t)wtlit + (1  )
Z 1
0

jtdj

and
W it 
rt 1

bit 1 +

qvt + dt


vit 1
as the non-nancial and nancial income of generation i households in period t. Then, the
budget constraint can be written as
Qt;t+1W
i
t+1 + c
i
t = H
i
t +W
i
t :
W it represents the real payo¤ from the households portfolio in all states of nature, but
conditional on the household surviving, and Qt;t+1 = r 1t is the price of receiving one unit
of that payo¤. Note that, should the household not survive, the payo¤ from the portfolio is
zero, such that the expected payo¤ from one unit of the portfolio across all states of nature,
including the survival/non-survival of the household, is the risk free real rate of interest rt.
Maximizing household utility subject to the budget constraint yields the consumption
Euler equation,
Qt;t+1 = 

cit
cit+1

or equivalently,
1 = rt

cit
cit+1

;
the labor supply condition,
(1   t)wt(1  lit) = {cit;
accumulation decision is undertaken by an innitely-lived entity, such that it is comparable to standard
analyses.
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and the no-arbitrage condition for equities,
qvt = r
 1
t
 
qvt+1 + dt+1

:
Using the household budget constraint, together with the Euler equation, and the no-
arbitrage condition for equities, we obtain the consumers consumption function
cit = (1  )
"
W it +
1X
s=0
()s
 
s 1Y
i=0
r 1t+i
!
H it+s
#
where the household discounts future labor and prot income more heavily than its straight
rate of time preference, as it will not receive that income should it die, but expectations are
taken over all states of nature, other than the survival/non-survival of the household. We
can further write this as
cit = (1  )

W it + lw
i
t

where lwit represents generation i
0s human wealth, given as the discounted value of labor
income and prots, where the e¤ective discount factor accounts for the probability of survival,
lwit  H it +
1X
s=1
()s
 
s 1Y
i=0
r 1t+i
!
H it+s = H
i
t +


rt

lwit+1:
2.2 Aggregating across Consumers and Consumption Dynamics.
If the size of each cohort when born is 1, then the size of a cohort i at time t is given by t i
and the total size of the population is then given by
Pt
i= 1 
t i = 11  . Aggregate (per
capita) variables are dened as, xt = (1   )
Pt
i= 1 
t ixit. Aggregating the consumers
labor supply yields, in per-capita terms,
{ct = (1   t)wt (1  lt) :
It is similarly possible to aggregate across consumers from di¤erent generations to obtain an
aggregate consumption function,
ct = (1  ) [Wt + lwt] :
Aggregate human wealth lwt is given by
lwt = Ht + 
lwt+1
rt
;
where period-t non-nancial income Ht is dened as
Ht 

(1   t)wtlt + (1  )
Z 1
0

jtdj

:
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The aggregate of nancial wealth is
Wt = rt 1bt 1 + (qvt + dt)vt 1
and it takes account of the fact that not all households will have survived from last period
into the current one. The householdsaggregate (per-capita) budget constraint is then given
by
bt + q
v
t vt + ct = (1   t)wtlt + rt 1bt 1 + (qvt + dt)vt 1 + (1  )
Z 1
0

jtdj:
2.3 The Capital Rental Firms Behavior
We assume that there is a single representative rm accumulating private capital for rental
to the nal goods producing rms. This rm seeks to maximize the discounted value of its
cash ows. This objective function is consistent with maximizing the value of the households
equity. Therefore the rms objective function is to maximize the following expression,
(qvt + dt) vt 1 = p
k
t kt 1   et +
1X
z=1
 
z 1Y
i=0
r 1t+i
!h
pkt+zkt+z 1   et+z
i
;
where pkt is the real rental cost of capital, kt 1 is the private capital stock used in production
at time t, and et is real investment expenditure. Assuming the capital stock depreciates at
rate , the equation of motion of the capital stock is then
kt = et + (1  )kt 1:
The rst order condition for investment is given by,
kt = 1;
where kt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the equation of motion for the capital
stock. Given the homogeneity of our prot function, this is equivalent to Tobins q so that, in
the absence of capital adjustment costs, Tobins q is one. Also, di¤erentiating the Lagrangian
with respect to kt gives the equation of motion for Tobins q,
1 = r 1t

pkt+1 + 1  

:
The capital accumulated by this sector is then rented out to the imperfectly competitive
rms producing nal goods for consumers, as described below.
This marginal q can be related to average q (and therefore the value of householdsequity)
as
kt kt + p
k
t kt 1   et = (qvt + dt)vt 1;
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so we can re-dene non-human wealth as,
Wt = rt 1bt 1 + (pkt + 1  )kt 1:
2.4 Capital and Labor Demand: Cost Minimization of Final Goods Firms
We assume there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive rms, indexed by j, which
produce the nal goods that enter the CES aggregate consumption basket. The optimal
combination of capital and labor, employed in the production of these goods, is obtained
from the cost minimization problem of the rm, given the production function it faces,
yjt = k
1
jt 1(A
l
tljt)
2(kpt 1)
3
where kjt 1 is the private capital employed by the rm, ljt is the labor employed by the
rm, Alt is labor embodied technical progress, and k
p
t 1 is the public stock of capital which
is a public good accumulated by the government. We assume that this production function
exhibits constant returns to scale in its arguments, so that the rm faces diminishing returns
in its private factors. Accordingly, the economy can experience exogenous growth through
labor-embodied technical progress, which occurs at a gross quarterly rate of !; such that
Alt+1 = !A
l
t.
This implies the following cost minimizing combination of labor and capital which, since
all nal goods rms are identical, can be written in terms of aggregate variables as
lt
kt 1
=
2
1
pkt
wt
where wt is the real wage rate and pkt the real rental price of capital. The real marginal cost
is then dened as,
mct = (yt)
1 1 2
1+2 
  1
1+2
1 
  2
1+2
2 (p
k
t )
1
1+2 (wt)
2
1+2 (Alt)
  2
1+2
 
kpt 1
  3
1+2
while total output is given by,
yt = k
1
t 1(A
l
tlt)
2(kpt 1)
3 :
2.5 Price Setting of Final Goods Firms
Given the demand curve for each individual good j, yt (j) = (pt (j) =Pt)
 " yt, rms set prices
at a constant markup over marginal cost and, in a symmetric equilibrium where pt (j) = Pt,
we have
(1  ") + "mct = 0:
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Equilibrium real (per capita) prots of all nal goods producers are then given as,
(1  )
Z 1
0

jtdj = yt  

wtlt + p
k
t kt 1

:
2.6 The Government
The government faces the following ow budget constraint,
gt + e
p
t =  twtlt + bt   rt 1bt 1;
where it nances public consumption gt and investment e
p
t by taxing labor income at rate
 t and issuing real one-period bonds bt, which pay a gross real rate of interest rt. The
government owns a stock of public capital kpt 1, which evolves as
kpt = e
p
t + (1  p) kpt 1;
where we allow the depreciation rate of public capital p to di¤er from that of private capital,
.
In the Ramsey policy we consider below, the government generally has access to three
instruments, namely public consumption and investment, as well as the labor income tax.
Therefore, although we occasionally allow for lump sum taxes as a diagnostic tool, in our
benchmark model the government only has access to distortionary taxation.
This completes the derivation of the model, which is summarized in Appendix A.1. Since
our model features exogenous growth, we further render the equilibrium stationary by de-
trending the relevant variables by the level of labor-embodied technical progress where all
detrended variables are denoted by a tilde and dened as ext = xt=Alt (see details in Appendix
A.2).
3 Social Welfare
In Appendix A.4 we derive the social welfare metric we employ in the paper. In doing
so we follow Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) in distinguishing between the intertemporal and
distributional aspects of welfare. We choose to focus on the former, such that we can rewrite
the objective function in terms of detrended variables as,
U0 =
1X
t=0
t ln (ut)
where ln (ut) = ln (ect)+# ln (egt)+{ ln (1  lt)+(1 + #)Pt 1s=0 ln (!)+(1 + #) lnAl0. This im-
plies we can obtain an exact expression for discounted lifetime welfare in terms of stationary
9
variables,
Ut = Ut+1 + ln (ect) + # ln (egt) + { ln (1  lt) + (1 + #)  
1   ln (!)

+ (1 + #) lnAl0:
Note that, in the benchmark analysis, we assume that the policy maker discounts the future
at the same rate as households do, but without accounting for the probability of death.
However, in the sensitivity analysis below, we shall allow the policy maker to possess a
discount factor  <  as a means of capturing the myopia implied by the various political
frictions that can give rise to a decit bias problem - see Alesina and Passalacqua (2017).
3.1 Optimal Fiscal Policy
Given the social welfare function, the optimal policy problem can be set up in terms of a
Lagrangian as,
L0 = max
yt
1X
t=0
t[U(yt+1;yt;yt 1;ut)  tf(yt+1;yt;yt 1;xt)]
where yt and xt are vectors of the models endogenous and exogenous variables, respec-
tively, U(yt+1;yt;yt 1;xt) = lnect + # ln egt + { ln (1  lt) + tip, where tip refers to terms
in productivity growth which are independent of policy, f(yt+1;yt;yt 1;xt) = 0 are the
models equilibrium conditions, and t is a vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with
these constraints.
The optimization implies the following rst order conditions,
@U(:)
@yt
+ F
@U(:)
@yt 1
+  1t 1F 1
@f(:)
@yt+1
+ t
@f(:)
@yt
+ t+1F
@f(:)
@yt 1

= 0 (1)
where F is the lead operator, such that F 1 is a one-period lag. We can then solve these
rst order conditions in combination with the non-linear equilibrium conditions of the model,
f(ys+1;ys;ys 1;xs) = 0:We do this fully non-linearly to obtain the steady-state of the policy
makers problem. Since this is a perfect foresight economy, we can also solve for the non-
linear transition dynamics using standard techniques, and we discuss those dynamic paths
below.
Social Planners Allocation
In exploring optimal policy, it is helpful to contrast the decentralized equilibrium with the
allocation that would be achieved by a social planner who simply implemented the rst-best
solution. The social planners problem, in stationary form, is given by,
L0 =
1X
t=0
t[lnect + # ln egt + { ln(1  lt)] + tip
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subject to, eyt = ekt 1=!1 l2t ekpt 1=!3 (2)
ekt = et + (1  )ekt 1=! (3)
and ekpt = ept + (1  p)ekpt 1=! (4)
eyt = ect + egt + et + ept (5)
Note that government debt does not exist in the social planners problem, so the constraints
involved in inheriting a positive debt level disappear. Deriving the FOCs and eliminating
the associated Lagrange multipliers gives us the optimal relationship between government
spending and consumption, egt = #ect (6)
while the labor allocation is given by
{ect = 2 eyt
lt

(1  lt) : (7)
The intertemporal consumption/saving decision, which is the modied Golden rule, is
!ec 1t = ec 1t+1
 
1
eyt+1ekt=! + 1  
!
(8)
and the balance between public and private forms of capital is given by
1
ekt 1=! 1 = 3 ekpt 1=! 1 + (   p) (eyt) 1 : (9)
Simultaneously solving equations (2)-(9) then yields the social planners allocation.
In the Ramsey problem the policy maker chooses tax rates, public consumption and
investment to maximize social welfare subject to the constraints implied by the decentralized
equilibrium. In order to develop intuition for the outcome in this case, it is helpful to contrast
the social planners FOCs to the equivalent conditions obtained as part of the decentralized
equilibrium. Firstly, we can write the labor allocation under the decentralized equilibrium
(the details of the derivations are included in Appendix A.3) as:
{ect = (1   t)"  1
"

2
eyt
lt

(1  lt) : (10)
This condition is in the same form as (7), except for the wedge due to the tax and monopolistic
competition distortions, (1   t) " 1" , which imply that the use of labor in production is sub-
optimally low. Accordingly, an ability to o¤er a subsidy equivalent to a negative income tax
of  t = 1  "" 1 would eliminate this distortion.
Similarly, we obtain the aggregate consumption Euler equation in the decentralized equi-
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librium (details also in the Appendix) as
ect = ect+1! 1 ""  1
"

1
eyt+1ekt=! + 1  
# 1
+
(1  )(1  )

ebt + ekt : (11)
Relative to the social planners allocation in (8), the presence of monopolistic competition in
the decentralized economy distorts the intertemporal savings allocation, while the presence
of nite lives gives rise to an additional term in the aggregate consumption dynamics which
the social planners allocation does not feature. This last term in (11) captures the fact that,
in order to induce nitely lived households to hold non-human wealth, the (growth-adjusted)
returns to that wealth need to exceed their rate of time preference.
This is the rst important implication of allowing for nite lives with no bequests: the
real rate of interest can di¤er from the rate of time preference even in steady state (the
implications of this point are discussed in Erosa and Gervais (2001)).5 The second important
di¤erence an OLG model makes is that government debt can crowd out capital. In steady
state, if consumption and real interest rates were unchanged, government debt would crowd
out private capital one for one. In fact consumption is likely to fall if capital falls, increasing
the extent of crowding out. However, a reduction in the capital stock will also raise real
interest rates, which for given consumption levels will raise the overall level of aggregate
assets, which moderates the degree of crowding out of capital. (In the innite life case,
which we approach as  tends to one, any increase in government debt leads to an equal
increase in savings, so there is no crowding out.)
Just as government debt crowds out capital, if the government holds assets (ebt < 0),
capital will be crowded in. If, when ebt = 0; capital is sub-optimally low, then accumulating
government assets can be used to move towards the optimal level of capital. We could dene
the level of government assets that achieve this optimum capital stock as the optimum
capital level of assets, or AK . Unless the economy with At =  ebt = 0 is dynamically
ine¢ cient6, such a move would not represent a Pareto improvement, because the higher taxes
that the government would require to accumulate assets would hit the current generation.
However, as any debt policy is almost certain to disadvantage some generation, this should
not prevent us considering using debt as a means of moving towards AK .
To correct both distortions, the optimal path for government debt would follow
 1
"
 
1
eyt+1ekt=!
!ect = (1  )(1  )

"
"  1
"

1
eyt+1ekt=! + 1  
#ebt + ekt : (12)
In the absence of the monopolistic competition distortion ("!1) this would simply imply
5Erosa and Gervais (2001) stress the fact that even in the aggregate steady-state the demographic turnover
observed in OLG models implies that standard results from representative agent models may not apply.
Therefore, for example, the time variation in tax elasticities over the life-cycle can imply that it is optimal to
have non-zero capital tax rates even in steady-state.
6 In this model of perpetual youth, r > !=, so the economy is never dynamically ine¢ cient. However
introducing either government assets, or allowing income to decline with age, can allow the possibility that
r < !=; as we note below.
12
bt =  kt, while with the monopolistic competition still in place the policy maker would
wish to accumulate assets in excess of the private capital stock, bt <  kt, in order to reduce
interest rates below the householdsrate of time preference and encourage the use of capital.
Accordingly a benevolent policy maker armed with a lump sum tax would levy that tax to
nance a subsidy for labor in order to o¤set the distortions due to the under-utilization of
labor implied by distortionary taxation and monopolistic competition. The policy maker
would then pursue a path for debt which would negate both the monopolistic competition
and nite lives distortions on the intertemporal savings decision in the decentralized economy.
Of course, without access to a lump sum tax it is generally not possible to simultaneously
achieve both goals unless the level of debt implied by (12) also happened to be at a level
which nances public consumption and investment in line with the social planners allocation
- (6) and (9), respectively - as well as the labor market subsidy,  t = 1  "" 1 .
We now turn to explore optimal policy in the absence of the lump sum taxation required
to simultaneous o¤set the distortions to both the intratemporal allocation of labor and the
intertemporal savings decisions. Interestingly, we shall see that the optimal policy need
not imply that we drive debt to a (negative) level which lies between that implied by the
need to eliminate the distortions to intertemporal savings behavior, (12), and the war chest
level needed to support desired levels of public consumption, investment, and o¤set the
monopolistic competition distortion by turning the income tax into a subsidy  t = 1  "" 1 .
3.2 Calibration
In order to analyze the main implications of our model, we rst calibrate the model based
on empirically observed levels of real GDP growth, public and private capital, government
consumption, labor income shares and government debt in the U.S. Between 1980 and 2008,
the average annualized growth rate was 2.88%, private and public capital to GDP ratios were
2.3 and 0.6 respectively, government consumption was 16% of GDP, the labor income share
was around 54% and government debt averaged 55.6% percent of GDP.7 Table 1 summarizes
the values of the calibrated baseline parameters and Table 2 summarizes the resultant steady
state.
The elasticity of demand with respect to price " is set to 11, consistent with a steady-state
mark-up, "=("   1), equal to 1:1. Parameter {, measuring the weight on leisure in utility,
was set to 1:19 such that households in our model economy allocate about a third of their
time to market activities (which is broadly in line with the empirical evidence). The weight
given to government consumption in utility, # = 0:24, implies that the policy maker would
ensure that government consumption as a share of private consumption is similar to the
patterns found in the US data. With a quarterly discount factor  of 0:9938 and a survival
probability of  = 0:995, implying an expected adult working life of 50 years8, our model can
7The debt to GDP ratio was obtained from the Public Debt Reports of the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, while the rest of the data values were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the
National Income and Product Accounts.
8We focus on economically active individuals (from 15 to 64 years old). 50 years is then a compromise
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 # { 1 2  p "
0.9938 0.995 0.24 1.19 0.35 0.59 0.021 0.0071 11.0
Table 1: Calibration of baseline model - Parameters
b=y ! g=y k=y kp=y wl=y r 
55.6% 2.88% 0.16 2.27 0.64 0.54 6% 0.39
Table 2: Calibration of baseline model - Initial Steady State
match these steady-state ratios with elasticities of output with respect to private capital and
labor of 1 = 0:35 and 2 = 0:59, respectively. This, in turn, implies a coe¢ cient on public
capital in production of 0:06; which is very close to the 0.05 adopted in Baxter and King
(1993) and well within the range of estimates considered in the meta-analysis of Bom and
Ligthart (2014). The depreciation rate on private capital, , is equal to 0:021; as estimated
by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). The depreciation rate of public capital, p = 0:0071,
was obtained from averaging the depreciation rates implied by the data on the public sector
capital stock and its depreciation, over the sample period considered.
It should be noted that this calibration is not based on the steady state of the Ramsey
problem, but the steady state of the structural model equations given the levels of government
consumption, investment, and taxes needed to support observed data levels of government
spending, public capital and government debt as a proportion of GDP, as well as labor
income shares, growth rates, and private capital/output ratios. In particular, government
consumption and investment are such that their ratios to output match the data values, while
the tax rate  is set to ensure the government budget constraint is satised. We shall see
that, when scal variables are chosen optimally, the economy will move a long way from this
starting point. For this reason, we do not employ any approximation techniques in solving
the model, such that steady-state solutions and dynamics of the model are all obtained as
fully non-linear solutions to the Ramsey policy problem described above.
3.3 The Optimal Debt Target
In this section, we examine the optimal level of steady-state government assets implied by
our model, using the calibration set out above. This is the solution to the Ramsey policy
makers problem, obtained by solving the non-linear equations of the model together with
the rst order conditions (1). In Table 3, the rst column of numbers details the steady
state implied by our calibration, which is taken to be the starting point prior to the various
optimal policy exercises being undertaken. The remaining columns describe the steady state
that emerges under various forms of optimal policy.9
To understand clearly the economic processes involved, it is easiest to begin, in the
second column of numbers of Table 3, with the allocation chosen by the social planner. This
between the years that Europeans are active, which is the reference variable for labour, and life expectancy
which is probably a more relevant variable for consumption. We also set economiclife expectancy equal to
50 years as a way of having a lower discount rate and, therefore, higher non-Ricardian e¤ects. Nevertheless,
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Variable Calibration Soc. Planner mc = 1, L.S. mc = 1 mc<1
(Benchmark)
Zero Debt Debt > 0
b=y 0.56 n.a. -2.58 -2.49 -2.82 0 0.56
k=y 2.27 2.58 2.58 2.58 2.36 2.29 2.28
kp=y 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.62
r 6% n.a. 5.47% 5.48% 5.39% 5.85% 5.93%
c=y 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.59
g=y 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12
 0.39 n.a. n.a. 0.17 0.18 0.29 0.32
l 0.33 0.48 0.48 0.43 0.39 0.35 0.34
w 2.17 n.a. 2.58 2.57 2.22 2.17 2.16
Welfare
Cost
n.a. 0 6.1% 18.8% 34.6% 39.1%
Table 3: Steady State of Ramsey Problem
allocation chooses the capital stock (public and private), consumption (public and private)
and hours worked to maximize welfare, without the need to raise taxes or government debt.
The third column of numbers then looks at a decentralized economy in which taxes are lump
sum and there is no monopoly power,10 but the government does choose the optimal level of
debt, as well as continuing to choose the optimum level of public consumption and capital.
It chooses to hold a level of government assets exactly equal to the size of the capital stock.
In e¤ect the government lends to the private sector who use the funds to purchase private
capital, such that the private sector holds no net assets.
To see why this has to be the case, recall that our social welfare function assumes a
discount rate equal to the rate of time preference. Without government debt, the Blan-
chard/Yaari model will imply a growth corrected real interest rate that exceeds this discount
rate and, as a result, consumers will start accumulating assets from the moment they are
born. Consequently, the capital stock will be below the level that would occur if all con-
sumers were innitely lived. To correct this underinvestment, the government has to reduce
the growth corrected real interest rate to the social discount rate, which would be the real
interest rate a decentralized equilibrium with innitely lived consumers would achieve, but
at that interest rate Blanchard/Yaari consumers would no longer wish to accumulate assets.
Column 4 replaces lump-sum taxes by distortionary labor income taxes, but still assumes
there is no monopolistic competition distortion. As we would expect, this reduces hours
worked and there is a decline in welfare.11 We now have a second motive for accumulating
government assets, which is to eliminate these distortionary taxes. If government assets were
in sensitivity analysis, we also consider the consequences of adopting a di¤erent probability of death.
9 In the next sub-section, we present the transition from the calibrated steady state to the steady state
implied by three of these optimal policies - namely, the social planners allocation, and the solutions to the
Ramsey policy makers problems with and without access to a lump-sum tax instrument.
10Equivalently, we could allow the policy maker to have access to a lump-sum tax and a subsidy instrument
(such as a negative income tax) with which to o¤set the monopolistic competition distortion.
11The welfare cost measures in the table give the percent decrease in welfare in each scenario, relative to
the rst best.
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large enough, we might imagine that interest receipts on these assets could fund the optimal
level of public consumption and maintain the optimal level of public capital. As we can see
from Table 3, column 4, taxes are still positive. More interesting is that the optimal level
of government nancial assets is now lower than in the previous column. This is somewhat
counter-intuitive. As distortionary taxes are not eliminated when government assets exactly
equal the capital stock, we might have expected the optimal level of government assets to lie
between this level and the level that eliminated all distortionary taxation. The reason we do
not get this result is because of the endogeneity of interest rates.
To formalize this slightly, consider a highly simplied characterization of the trade-o¤s
facing the policy maker in our model in which social welfare could be represented as follows:12
Wt =  
1X
i=0
i
h
T 2t+i + 
 
At+i  AK
2i
where T represents the revenues raised by distortionary taxes and AK is the level of gov-
ernment assets that, in the absence of distortionary taxes, would maximize social welfare.
If nite lives were the only distortion in the economy, then the government can mimic the
social planners allocation by lending to households to enable them to accumulate capital
without holding any net assets, AK = k. But with monopolistic competition as an additional
distortion AK > k and the equilibrium real interest rate depends on actual government assets
such that when A < (>)k then r > (<)1=. However, if we assume that there are no lump
sum taxes then there is an additional incentive to accumulate assets to nance government
expenditure and reduce distortionary taxes to zero.
We begin by assuming that there is no monopolistic competition distortion, then AK = k.
This model therefore contains the two distortionspresent in Table 3, column 4: distortionary
taxes and that the decentralized economy without government assets will accumulate too
little capital. In our overlapping generations economy the equilibrium interest rate is not
simply equal to household preferences but depends on the stock of government debt/assets,
which we give a general form, rt = r (At   k), where r(0) = 1=, and r0(:) < 0 i.e. as the
government accumulates nancial assets the equilibrium real interest rate falls, cet. par.,
falling below the householdsrate of time preference once A > k.
The government chooses taxes and government assets to maximize social welfare subject
to its budget constraint
At = rt 1At 1 + Tt  G
where, for simplicity, we treat government spending as xed.
The Lagrangian for this problem can be written as
L =
1X
i=0
i
h
T 2t+i + 
 
At+i  AK
2
+ 2t+i(At+i   rt+i 1At+i 1   Tt+i +G)
i
12While this is a simple and ad-hoc representation, it helps provide intuition for the results we obtain.
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with rst order conditions
Tt+i   t+i = 0
and

 
At+i  AK

+ t+i   t+i+1

rt+i + r
0
t+i(:)At+i

= 0:
In steady state these can be simplied to
(A AK) = [r(:)  1]T + r0(:)AT: (13)
When A = AK = k, r = 1; and r0(0) < 0, this equation cannot hold when taxes are
positive. Instead, the only feasible steady state with positive taxes is where A < AK = k
and r(:) > 1: The reason is straightforward. If we tried to increase government assets above
AK to eliminate more distortionary taxes, this would reduce real interest rates, and therefore
the return on these assets. This lower return would o¤set the benets of lower taxes, so we
would fail to eliminate additional distortionary taxes. In fact, in this simple characterization
of our model, the optimal level of government assets that maximizes debt interest receipts is
below AK . Column 4 in Table 3 suggests that this is also true in our microfounded model.
In Column 5 of Table 3, we add in the nal distortion in our model, monopoly power.
This is like a tax on prots and the returns to capital, and therefore signicantly reduces the
level of capital relative to output (and, of course, the level of output itself). The government
attempts to compensate for this to some extent by increasing government nancial assets
compared to the level in the previous column, and the growth corrected real interest rate
now falls below the rate of time preference. However the extent to which it can mitigate this
monopoly distortion is small, because by reducing real interest rates it is lowering receipts
from these assets (note the income tax rate rises). This can be seen from equation (13) in
the simple representation of the trade-o¤s facing the policy maker. In the presence of the
monopolistic competition distortion AK > k, and A must fall short of AK > k once interest
rates fall below the householdsrate of time preference and given that further accumulation
of nancial assets on the part of the government will depress interest rates further r0(:) < 0.13
Column 6 of Table 3 does not compute optimal government nancial assets, but instead
sets them to zero, while column 7 sets them to more realistic values, as given by the data
average b=y = 0:56. (The level of public consumption and physical capital continue to be
chosen optimally.) These columns indicate the welfare losses implied by not having the gov-
ernment hold nancial assets, or issuing government debt. Welfare decreases substantially,
partly because the capital stock falls, but also because the extent of distortionary taxation
increases. The size of these welfare losses indicates the extent of the costs of positive gov-
ernment debt in this type of economy.14 Before considering the question of how quickly the
13Conditional on the steady-state values reported in this benchmark case, the targetdebt stock implied
by equation (12) is an annualised debt to gdp ratio of -16.4 suggesting that the optimal policy falls well short
of the value of Ak that would apply in the case of a monopolistic competition distortion.
14We also considered a range of empirically relevant values for the debt to GDP ratio. A b=y value of 0.4,
for example, implies a welfare loss of 17.29% relative to the socially optimal outcome, which increases by a
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government might attempt to transform nancial debt into nancial assets to achieve these
welfare gains, we consider some robustness exercises.
Sensitivity Analysis We undertake a sensitivity analysis of the optimal steady-state
debt-to-GDP ratio with respect to a few parameters. These are chosen to reect the possi-
bility that recent trends in ratios used in the calibration may di¤er from historical averages,
as well as providing additional insight into the mechanisms driving our main results. Specif-
ically, we consider variations in the preference for public goods in utility #, the productivity
growth rate !, the survival probability rate , the elasticity of output with respect to labor
2 (relative to that of private capital) and the elasticity of output with respect to public
capital 3 (relative to that of private capital), and nally the policy makers rate of time
preference . For the rst four parameters (#; !; ; and 2), we consider alternative values
that aim to capture recent data trends and expected future values as reected in economic
forecasts. The alternative value for 3 spans the range of empirical estimates. While for the
policy makers rate of time preference parameter ; we choose a range of values that describe
di¤erent degrees of myopia on the part of the government, who discounts the future more
heavily than households.
The results are reported in Table 4, where column 1 repeats Column 5 of Table 3 and gives
the optimal level of government assets in the presence of the monopoly and tax distortions
(the case we consider as the benchmark scenario). Column 2 in Table 4 reduces the preference
for public goods consumption, by reducing the weight on government consumption in utility
from # = 0:24 to # = 0:15. This parameter reects the desirable ratio of government
consumption to private consumption. The lower value we choose captures a recent downward
trend in the g/cratio in the data and is at the lower end of the range of observed values over
the post-WW II period. The optimal policy now slightly raises the stock of government assets
relative to the benchmark case - essentially, there is less need to maintain high interest rate
income on government assets, given that the stream of government consumption requiring
nancing is now reduced. Accordingly, more government assets are accumulated in order to
reduce interest rates and encourage private capital accumulation, in a manner which o¤sets
both the nite lives distortion and that due to imperfect competition.
Column 3 reduces the annualized exogenous growth rate ! from the historical average
of 2:88% to a lower expected rate of 1:84%, which is an average of OECD projections over
the next 50 years (OECD Economic Outlook, May 2013). We notice that the lower rate of
productivity growth raises the stock of government assets and, at the same time, there is a
marked increase in the ratios of both public and private investment to GDP. This reects
the policy makers attempt to mimic a similar increase in the capital-to-GDP ratios that
arises in the social planners allocation. Essentially, more capital accumulation is required
to help compensate for the reduced labor productivity, while maximizing welfare. In the
decentralized economy with nite-lives, a corresponding accumulation of government assets
further 1.6% when b=y = 0:8. Generally, the higher are the government debt levels, the further is the economy
away from its optimal setting and the larger are the associated welfare losses.
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Variable Benchmark # = 0:15 ! = 1:84%  = 0:9958 2 = 0:57 3 = 0:106 = 0:99
b=y -2.82 -3.19 -3.07 -2.82 -3.00 -2.16 3.04
k=y 2.36 2.37 2.55 2.36 2.49 2.02 2.21
kp=y 0.65 0.66 0.74 0.65 0.65 1.20 0.48
r 5.39% 5.34% 4.32% 5.41% 5.38% 5.45% 6.31%
c=y 0.57 0.61 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.58 0.6
g=y 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12
 0.18 0.09 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.46
l 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.29
w 2.22 2.23 2.36 2.21 2.53 2.05 2.08
Table 4: Steady State of Ramsey Problem - Sensitivity Analysis
is needed in order to reduce interest rates and facilitate the crowding in of private sector
capital, which is what we observe in Column 3.
Column 4 raises the survival probability from  = 0:995 to  = 0:9958, reecting an
increase in the retirement age and longer working lives, as observed in the U.S. and other
developed economies. The consumption planning horizon of the individuals in our economy
is now 60 years. The higher  reduces the impact of government debt/assets on the real
interest rate. Accordingly, the policy maker needs to accumulate slightly higher levels of
assets to achieve a given reduction in the real interest rate and the desired crowding in
of private sector capital. However, the observed di¤erences are very small, only to a third
decimal point for most variables, suggesting that longer working lives in the range considered
have almost no bearing on optimal debt levels.
In column 5, we consider an alternative parameterization of the production function,
with a lower elasticity of output with respect to labor (lower 2) and a higher elasticity
with respect to private capital (higher 1), reecting a recent downward trend in labor
income shares in the data and the capital-labor substitution hypothesis (as discussed in
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Elsby et al. (2013)). Relative to the benchmark
calibration, 2 is now reduced by 0.2 to 0.57, while 1 rises to 0.37.15 There is, in this
case, an optimal re-allocation of resources (as given by the social planner), that sees more
accumulation of private capital and an increase in the private capital to GDP ratio. The
policy maker would try to achieve a similar allocation, by accumulating more assets and
reducing interest rates, thus inducing more crowding in of private capital, which is what we
observe in the results of column 5.
Column 6 then investigates the relative importance of public capital in production, by
considering a higher elasticity of output with respect to public capital 3 = 0:106 (that
matches the average estimate in Bom and Ligthart (2014)), and a correspondingly lower
elasticity with respect to private capital, 1. As public capital is now relatively more im-
portant, we observe an increase in the ratio of public to private capital. As such, the policy
maker accumulates relatively fewer assets, the interest rate is higher and the level of private
15The new value of 2 is set to match a lower labour income share of 0.52 (as average over the 2012-2014
period) and the assumed benchmark markup of 1.1.
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capital lower than under the benchmark case. At the same time, a higher tax rate is needed
to nance the increased public investment expenditures, which in turn discourages labor
supply.
Policy Maker Myopia
The nal column of Table 4 drops the assumption that policy makers share the same
rate of time preference as individual households. Instead, we assume that the policy maker
discounts the future more heavily than an innitely-lived household would,  < . This is
intended to act as a short-cut means of capturing the numerous political frictions that give
rise to a decit bias problem (see, Alesina and Passalacqua (2017) for an extensive survey),
where the policy maker essentially attaches more weight to the short-run cost of decit
reduction relative to the longer-run benets of lower debt. Specically, in the nal column
of Table 4, we allow policy makers to be slightly more myopic than households and discount
the future more heavily, such that its discount factor is lower,  = 0:99 <  = 0:9938.
This myopia turns the desired debt to GDP ratio positive (at a rate of 304% of GDP) with
an associated rise in the tax rate. There is a signicant rise in the real interest rate and
crowding out of private sector capital. The impact of myopia is so striking that it might
be thought that this amounts to an extreme degree of the policy makers short-sightedness.
We can assess this in di¤erent ways. The annualized increase in discounting of the future is
given by ( 4    4)  100 = 1:58%, which is not obviously outrageous. Alternatively, we
can imagine the policy maker faces a probability of electoral death which reduces their time
horizon. The extra discounting assumed in this experiment implies that the policy maker
still has an e¤ective time horizon of over 65 years.
We explore this issue further in Figure 1 which plots both the steady-state debt to GDP
levels and the welfare costs of varying the myopia of the policy maker. This shows that the
steady-state debt level turns positive with increased discounting of 0:75% (an e¤ective time
horizon of 137 years) and a welfare cost of 35:4% relative to the rst best. While with myopia
of an increased discounting of around 1% p.a. the desired debt to GDP ratio has risen to
100% with a welfare cost of 50%. This gives a measure of the scale of the costs associated
with even relatively modest political frictions. The results reported in Figure 1 suggest that
the welfare costs of myopia are most pronounced at very high debt levels. Therefore, it
appears that creating scal institutions which credibly allow for scal consolidations is likely
to be welfare improving in the long run.
We could extend the robustness checks further by changing the functional forms of the
utility and production functions, allowing for di¤erent degrees of substitutability between
public and private consumption and capital. However, this is not dissimilar to the changes
in weights attached to government consumption in utility and public/private capital in pro-
duction considered above and is unlikely to change the fact that the optimal policy mainly
seeks to drive interest rates close to their modied golden rule level in the long run.
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3.4 Transition Paths
In this section, we present a brief analysis of the optimal transition path to the Ramsey steady
state, using a simulation of the full non-linear Ramsey policy.16 Our simulation begins at the
calibrated steady state which features public and private capital to GDP ratios of 0.64 and
2.27, respectively, alongside a debt to GDP ratio of just over 50%. Starting from that initial
position, the Ramsey policy will move us towards the steady state labelled benchmarkin
Table 4, where the long-run capital to GDP ratios for public and private capital are 0.65 and
2.36, respectively, and the government debt to GDP ratio has fallen to -2.82.
We look at the transition between this initial state to the Ramsey steady state in two
ways. The rst year impact of adopting the optimal scal policy is shown in Figures 2 and
3, where the solid line details the paths followed by key variables in the initial year of the
optimal policy. The full transition path is shown in Figures 4 and 5. The most striking
aspect of the early response to the switch to optimal policy is that it is desirable to reduce
debt by undertaking a very large sale of public capital. Although the initial stock of public
capital is close to its optimal steady state value, the optimal transition path involves cutting
this stock (relative to GDP) by almost half and then gradually rebuilding it.
Releasing this substantial quantity of goods leads to a sharp fall in the real interest rate,
which increases both consumption and the stock of private capital. There is also a sharp
fall in public consumption, but as Table 3 shows (particularly the nal column) this is not
so much a temporary deviation from the steady state as a correction from a sub-optimal
allocation in the initial calibration.
Although there are clear welfare advantages to moving towards the steady state level of
debt quickly, standard smoothing arguments mean that it is not optimal to sharply increase
taxes or to reduce government consumption beyond its optimal level. It is interesting that
these arguments do not apply to public capital in our model. One reason for this is that, as
public capital can be costlessly transformed into private capital, any substitution between
the two will mean output falls only because we move away from the optimal factor mix.
However, it is important to remember that there are no investment adjustment costs in our
model, so such large movements in capital are not going to be realistic. However, given the
very long time scales over which the stock of public capital is rebuilt during the transition
adding capital adjustment costs would simply lengthen the period over which the public
capital is reduced, prior to being rebuilt.
Once we move beyond the initial period, the remainder of the adjustment is far smoother
as Figures 3 and 4 show. Although a signicant part of the debt reduction is achieved
very quickly by selling public capital, it takes over 100 years to achieve the rst 50% of the
adjustment, and complete adjustment takes around 500 years. This very long adjustment
period is not surprising for two reasons. First, while complete tax smoothing no longer
applies, the Blanchard-Yaari framework with realistic values for the probability of death gives
16We solve the non-linear FOCs in Dynare under perfect foresight (since our model does not contain any
aggregate uncertainty and idiosyncratic risk is insured through the households purchase of death-contingent
annuities) using the Newton algorithm.
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only quantitatively minor deviations from Ricardian Equivalence, and so a large smoothing
element is retained. Second, earlier analysis using models of this type suggest very long
drawn out dynamics (e.g. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000)). The result that debt adjustment
should be very slow appears fairly robust (see Marcet and Scott (2008) and Leeper and Leith
(2017), for example).
Following the reduction in public capital, the transition is relatively smooth, although
the policy mix changes as the transition progresses. The observed evolution in the policy mix
reects the non-linearities associated with di¤erent levels of government debt/assets. At large
debt levels, it is desirable to reduce debt interest costs by encouraging saving - this is achieved
by the reduction in public capital and by committing to raise taxes and government spending
in the future. However, as government debt levels fall the impact of interest rates on debt
dynamics are far less pronounced and taxes must rise while government spending is reduced
to sustain the accumulation of government assets. Finally, as the stock of government assets
is increased, higher interest rates actually facilitate the transition and the optimal policy
gradually rebuilds the stock of public capital and reduces tax rates. Accordingly, we observe
a substantial reduction in real interest rates in the early stages of the transition when debt
levels are high, followed by a gradual rise and eventual over-shooting of real interest rates
when debt levels turn negative.
One interesting feature of the adjustment path is the behavior of consumption. The
idea that a reduction in debt requires consumption to initially decline before increasing to a
higher steady state value is familiar and is, of course, one reason why reductions in debt are so
di¢ cult to achieve politically. However comparing Figures 2 and 4 shows that throughout the
adjustment path consumption is always above its initial level, because initially consumption
jumps up following the sale of public capital. This suggests that, thanks to the existence of
public capital that can be transformed into private capital, its sale can reduce the costs of
debt reduction for the current generations.
Despite the fact that the speed of adjustment is very slow, the size of adjustment required
from current levels of debt is also very large. As a result, the implications for debt reduction
today will still be signicant. We should also note, however, that our starting point for
adjustment does not involve interest rates at the zero lower bound and a large recession,
so our analysis has no immediate implications for the stimulus versus austerity debate.
However, we can contrast the transition paths for identical economies starting from di¤erent
initial levels of public debt. Here, we can see that since all the economies will tend to the
same steady-state level of government assets in the long run, any initial shock to government
debt will only be eliminated very slowly, with clear di¤erences across the transition paths
for at least 150 years. This implies that, even if it may be optimal to substantially reduce
government debt in the long run, the fact that the recent nancial crisis has raised government
debt levels does not imply that that scal correction need be noticeably more rapid.
The Figures also contrast the Ramsey policy implemented through variations in distor-
tionary taxation (along with optimal values of government consumption and investment),
with the policies that would be pursued by a policy maker enjoying an ability to levy lump-
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sum taxes (dashed green line) and the allocation that would be chosen by the social planner
(dotted blue line). In the initial periods both the policy maker with access to lump sum tax-
ation and the social planner would temporarily reduce the stock of public capital, however
not to the same extent as our benchmark policy maker. The ability to levy lump sum taxes
is highly benecial as it allows the policy maker to dramatically accumulate government
assets, reduce real interest rates and crowd in private capital in a manner which is close to
mimicking the social planners allocation. The only key di¤erence is that the social plan-
ner is not faced with the monopolistic competition distortion which is still a feature of the
economy with lump-sum taxes. In contrast, the sustained increase in distortionary taxation
in the benchmark economy, depresses hours worked and consumption for a prolonged period
and greatly slows the transition period relative to the path chosen by the social planner
and approximated by the policy maker who possesses lump-sum taxes as a scal instrument.
Finally, it should be noted that the case where the policy maker had access to both lump
sum taxes and an instrument with which to subsidize production (such as a negative labor
income tax) would perfectly mimic the dynamic path chosen by the social planner.
4 Conclusions
In models without default where agents are e¤ectively innitely lived, there is no optimal debt
target because the costs of reducing debt are always higher than the cost of accommodating
the existing level of debt. In OLG models this is no longer true for two reasons. First, the
real rate of interest is likely to be above the rate of time preference, so the benets, in terms
of lower taxes, of future reductions in debt now outweigh the current costs of achieving lower
debt. Second, the level of the capital stock is likely to be below the socially optimal level,
and reductions in debt will crowd in capital.
In this paper we examine the optimal level of debt in one particular OLG model, the
model of perpetual youth. We show that the optimal debt target in a calibrated version of
this model involves positive government assets (i.e. a negative debt target), but these assets
are below both the level required to eliminate distortionary taxes, and the level required
to achieve the optimum capital stock. This is because, when the economy is distorted by
monopolistic competition and income taxes, as debt declines the real rate of interest falls
below the rate of time preference before the economy reaches the optimal capital stock. The
optimal transition path towards this steady state is very drawn out, involving hundreds of
years, but as the steady state involves historically unprecedented levels of government assets,
the implications for debt adjustment in the short term may still be quantitatively signicant.
Finally, we found that introducing policy maker myopia, as a proxy for the kinds of
political frictions that lead policy makers to prioritize avoiding the short-term costs of scal
consolidation over the longer-term benets, had a signicant impact on the steady-state debt
level, turning it positive for relatively modest degrees of policy maker short-sightedness. This
suggests that enhancing scal policy institutions, to allow policy makers to undertake very
gradual scal consolidations which credibly reduce debt levels in the longer term, is likely to
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be signicantly welfare improving.
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A Appendix
A.1 Summary of Aggregate Model
The aggregate consumption function is
ct = (1  ) [Wt + lwt] (14)
where all variables are in per capita terms.
The aggregate nancial wealth in real terms is
Wt = rt 1bt 1 + (pkt + 1  )kt 1 (15)
while aggregate human wealth is
lwt = Ht + 
lwt+1
rt
(16)
and the period-t non-nancial income is given by
Ht  (1   t)wtlt + (1  )
Z 1
0

jtdj: (17)
The denition of prots is
(1  )
Z 1
0

jtdj = yt  

wtlt + p
k
t kt 1

: (18)
The government budget constraint is given by
gt + e
p
t =  twtlt + bt   rt 1bt 1: (19)
Combine the householdsaggregate resource constraint with the government budget con-
straint and the denition of prots to obtain the aggregate resource constraint
gt + e
p
t + ct + et = yt: (20)
Labor supply satises the condition
(1   t)wt (1  lt) = {ct: (21)
The equations of motion of the private and public capital stocks are
kt = et + (1  )kt 1 (22)
and
kpt = e
p
t + (1  p)kpt 1 (23)
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while the rst order condition for investment is given by
1 = r 1t

pkt+1 + 1  

: (24)
Monopolistic competition implies
(1  ") + "mct = 0: (25)
The rmscost minimisation gives the factorsshare
lt
kt 1
=
2
1
pkt
wt
(26)
while the real marginal cost is given by
mct = (yt)
1 1 2
1+2 
  1
1+2
1 
  2
1+2
2 (p
k
t )
1
1+2 (wt)
2
1+2 (Alt)
  2
1+2
 
kpt 1
  3
1+2 : (27)
The aggregate output function is
yt = k
1
t 1(A
l
tlt)
2
 
kpt 1
3 : (28)
A.2 Stationary Model
With an exogenous growth rate in labor-embodied technical progress of !; such that Alt+1 =
!Alt; we can render the equilibrium stationary by deating the following variables {yt, ct, gt,
wt, kt, k
p
t , et, e
p
t , bt, Wt, lwt} by the level of labor-embodied technical progress, such thatext = xt=Alt.
The aggregate consumption function:
ect = (1  ) hfWt +flwti (29)
Aggregate nancial wealth:
fWt = rt 1
!
ebt 1 +  pkt + 1  
!
ekt 1 (30)
Aggregate human wealth:
flwt = eHt + !flwt+1
rt
(31)
Period-t non-nancial income:
Ht  (1   t) ewtlt + (1  )Z 1
0
e
jtdj (32)
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The denition of prots:
(1  )
Z 1
0
e
jtdj = eyt    ewtlt + pkt ekt 1=! (33)
The government budget constraint:
egt + ept =  t ewtlt +ebt   rt 1! ebt 1 (34)
The aggregate resource constraint:
egt + ept + ect + et = eyt (35)
The labor supply:
(1   t) ewt (1  lt) = {ect (36)
The equations of motion of the private and public capital stocks:
ekt = et + (1  )ekt 1=! (37)
and ekpt = ept + (1  p)ekpt 1=! (38)
The rst order condition for investment:
1 = r 1t

pkt+1 + 1  

(39)
Price-setting implies,
(1  ") + "mct = 0 (40)
Factorsshare:
ltekt 1=! = 21 p
k
tewt (41)
The real marginal cost:
mct = (eyt) 1 1 21+2   11+21   21+22 pkt  11+2 ( ewt) 21+2 ekpt 1=!  31+2 (42)
The production function:
eyt = ekt 1=!1 l2t ekpt 1=!3 : (43)
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A.3 Further Derivations
In section 3.1 in the paper, we contrast the social planners rst order condition for labor
and the aggregate consumption Euler equation with equivalent conditions obtained in the
decentralized equilibrium. In this section of the Appendix, we show how we derived the
latter (equations (10) and (11) in the main text).
Firstly, we combine the labor supply condition (36) with the demand for labor, wt =
mct

2
yt
lt

, and the rmspricing decision (40) that denes the real marginal costmct = " 1" ,
to obtain the labor allocation under the decentralized equilibrium,
{ect = (1   t)"  1
"

2
eyt
lt

(1  lt) ; (44)
This is equation (10) in the main text.
Secondly, combining the consumption function (29) with the evolution of human wealth
(31) and non-human wealth (30) yields the aggregate consumption Euler equation in the
decentralized equilibrium,
ect = !ect+1
rt
+
(1  )(1  )

ebt + ekt :
Furthermore, using the FOC for investment (39), together with the demand for capital in
production, pkt = mct

1
yt
kt 1

, and the real marginal cost relationshipmct = " 1" , the above
expression can be re-written as,
ect = ect+1! 1 ""  1
"

1
eyt+1ekt=! + 1  
# 1
+
(1  )(1  )

ebt + ekt ; (45)
which is equation (11) in the main text.
A.4 Welfare Metric
Dening what is optimal in an OLG model involves deciding how to compare di¤erent gen-
erations. Since we are interested in formulating optimal policy for our economy populated
with overlapping generations of nitely lived consumers we must face the tricky issue of
constructing a welfare metric. Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) dene the social welfare function
at time 0 as,
U0 =
1X
s=0
" 1X
t=s
u(s; t)()t s
#
s +
0X
s= 1
" 1X
t=0
u(s; t)()t s
#
s
where u(s; t) = ln cst + # ln gt + { ln(1   lst ) is the utility at time t of a household born at
time s. The rst summation is the utility of representative agents of generations yet to be
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born, discounted at the policy makers discount factor, . The second is the expected utility
of households currently alive. These utilities are discounted back to the birth date of the
currently living generations, rather than the current period. Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) note
that this is necessary to avoid the time inconsistency in preferences that would otherwise
emerge by treating generations asymmetrically. In other words, if the policy maker did not
discount utilities back to birth dates, then she would wish to change the consumption plans
she put in place for currently unborn generations the moment they are born.
By changing the order of summation the welfare function can be rewritten as,
U0 =
1X
t=0
"
tX
s= 1
u(s; t)



t s#
t
so that the instantaneous ow utility to the policy maker is given by the summation over
generations of their instantaneous utility discounted by the private discount factor and ad-
justed by the public discount factor. These are then discounted over time using the policy
makers discount factor, . This can be further rewritten as,
U0 =
1X
t=0
" 1X
z=0
u(t  z; t)



z#
t
which allows us to decompose the policy-makers problem into two parts. The rst part
involves the policy makers optimal allocation of consumption and labor supply across house-
holds. The second relates to the intertemporal aspects of the problem. Since we are only
interested in the macroeconomic e¤ects of scal adjustment in an environment where gov-
ernment debt can potentially crowd-out private capital, we abstract from the intratemporal
intergenerational problem and focus on the intertemporal problem, such that the social wel-
fare function is given by,
U0 =
1X
t=0
t[ln ct + # ln gt + { ln(1  lt)]
Finally, in our benchmark analysis we assume  =  such that the policy maker discounts
the future at the same rate as households, but without accounting for the probability of
death. However, there is no necessary reason for us to do this and, in sensitivity analysis, we
also look at an alternative with more discounting. In solving its intertemporal problem the
policy maker ignores the distribution of variables across generations at a given point in time
by focusing on per-capita variables.17 This is the welfare metric we employ after rewriting
it in terms of stationary variables as given in the main text.
17Allowing aggregate policy to consider distributional issues when implementing macro policy would require
us to track the distribution of nancial wealth across generations, which is generally intractable due to the
impact of the birth of new generations on that distribution. At the same time, it should be noted that,
at least in principle, the government could implement a lump-sum intratemporal redistribution scheme to
maximise social welfare. However, such a policy would e¤ectively o¤set the di¤erential tax treatment of
di¤erent generations that the perpetual youth model relies on to break from Ricardian Equivalence.
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Figures
Figure 1: Optimal values of debt-to-GDP ratios and the welfare costs of varying the myopia
of policy makers. The horizontal axis gives the annualized increase in discounting the future
by the Ramsey planner, relative to individual households, as a percentage.
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Notes to Dynamics Figures 25: Solid red line - benchmark model with distortionary
taxation; dashed green line - lump sum taxation; dotted blue line - social planners allocation.
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Figure 2: Ramsey Dynamics in the First Year I
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Figure 3: Ramsey Dynamics in the First Year II
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Figure 4: Ramsey Dynamics Beyond the First Year I
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Figure 5: Ramsey Dynamics Beyond the First Year II
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